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1.  Introduction
It is an established empirical fact that very few individuals purchase life annuities in the
United States.  Why this is the case has long been a puzzle to economists.  Annuities should be
of substantial value to risk averse individuals in a life-cycle model with uncertain lifetimes.
Despite the large literature that explores possible resolutions of this puzzle, surprisingly little
direct empirical evidence exists to guide our understanding of who annuitizes, and what factors
influence this decision.  Reconciling the theory with such empirical evidence is essential to
understanding the annuity puzzle.
The primary contribution of this paper is to use micro data to directly examine  household
decisions about whether or not to annuitize balances in defined contribution pension plans.  A
central goal is to test whether or not this annuitization decision is consistent with the stochastic
life-cycle model that economists commonly use to study annuitization decisions.  Using dynamic
programming techniques, I construct a utility-based measure of a life-cycle consumer’s valuation
of additional annuitization, or the “annuity equivalent wealth” (AEW).  This measure varies
across households based on mortality, risk aversion, marital status, and the presence of pre-
existing annuity flows from Social Security.  I then ask whether this single annuity equivalent
wealth measure can explain annuitization intentions, as the life-cycle model suggests it should.
The results indicate that this calculated measure of annuity value is significantly correlated with
expected annuitization decisions.
Whether or not households choose to annuitize their retirement assets has a number of
important economic implications.  First and foremost, it has a direct effect on how well prepared
individuals are to provide for consumption in old age.  Adequacy of resources for old-age
consumption in turn directly affects the extent of poverty among elderly widows, and the2
financial pressure placed on needs-based social insurance programs for the elderly such as SSI
and Medicaid.  Second, households who annuitize their assets will not leave these resources to
their heirs when they die.  Thus, the extent of annuitization can potentially affect the aggregate
amount of intergenerational transfers taking place in the economy, the distribution of wealth in
the younger generation of inheritors, and even the amount of estate tax revenue collected.
There are at least two reasons that  these questions are becoming ever more important.
First, the past 25 years has witnessed a dramatic shift in the composition of private pension plans
away from traditional defined benefit plans, which typically paid out in the form of a life
annuity, towards defined contribution plans, which offer the individual choice over the form of
the benefit payment.  This trend towards increased importance of DC plans is expected to
continue.  For example, by the year 2025 the average value of 401(k) plan assets is expected to
rival the present discounted value of Social Security benefits (Poterba, Venti, & Wise 1998).
Second, the current debate over the future of Social Security has spawned a number of
proposals that would create a system of mandatory individual savings accounts as a supplement
to or partial substitute for the current annuitized system.  One of the key issues in this debate is
whether or not to mandate annuitization of these individual account balances.  An examination of
current behavior with respect to DC pension plans is a starting point for understanding how
individuals might respond to such a system.
The results of this paper indicate that the utility-based measure of annuity equivalent
wealth (AEW) that is constructed from a stochastic life-cycle model is significantly positively
correlated with the  ex ante probability of actually annuitizing DC balances.  Specifically, a one-
percentage point increase in the calculated annuity equivalent wealth is associated with nearly a
one percentage-point increase in the probability that an individual before retirement reports that3
they will annuitize.  This effect is highly significant, and robust to many specific modeling
assumptions and to the inclusion of a wide range of covariates.
This finding, that  the predictions of the life-cycle model are in fact correlated with
expected behavior, provides empirical support for many previous studies.  Some version of the
life-cycle model has been used in nearly every simulation study of annuity demand (for example:
Kotlikoff & Spivak 1981, Friedman & Warshawsky 1988, Mitchell et al 1999), yet there has
been no prior empirical evidence supporting the use of this model for analyzing annuity choices.
The ability of the life-cycle model to predict economic behavior has been questioned in a number
of contexts, such as savings behavior (Thaler 1991).  This study represents the first evidence that
the predictions of the life-cycle model regarding annuity behavior are in fact correlated with the
outcome of interest.
However, these results also indicate that while the predictions of the life-cycle model are
a good “first approximation” to expected behavior, the model leaves much variation unexplained.
There are a number of factors which are difficult to incorporate directly into the calculated
annuity equivalent wealth measure that are significant determinants of the annuity decision, such
as poor health status.  Importantly, one factor that is found  not to have a significant effect is the
presence of bequest motives.  This result is consistent with Hurd’s (1986) finding that bequest
motives do not influence wealth decumulation patterns of the elderly.  I also find that there is a
subset of the population, those with self-reported short time horizons for financial decision
making, for whom the predictions of the life-cycle model do not predict annuity decisions.
This paper is organized as follows:  Background information on DC pension plans is
described in Section 2.  The predictions of the simple life-cycle model with uncertain lifetimes
are discussed in Section 3, along with a discussion of the model's limitations.  Section 4 explains4
the methodology for implementing the life-cycle measure of annuity valuation.  The data set
used, sample selection, and the parameterization of the model are discussed in Section 5.  Results
are presented and discussed in Sections 6 & 7.  Section 8 concludes.
2. Recent Growth in Defined Contribution Plans
Over the past 25 years, the pension landscape in the U.S. has altered dramatically.  The
1974 enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) signaled a dramatic
change in the regulation and oversight of private pensions in the U.S.  This was followed by the
introduction of 401(k) plans in 1978, as well as 1981 clarifying regulations that sparked a
dramatic increase in 401(k) plan availability and participation.
This change in the legal environment, and the increasing administrative costs that these
changes induced for defined benefit plans (McGill, et al 1996), have contributed to making
defined contribution plans an increasingly important source of retirement resources.  Between
1975 and 1993, the number of private defined contribution plans in existence nearly tripled,
rising from 208,000 to 619,000.  Meanwhile, the number of defined benefit plans peaked at
175,000 in 1983, and then fell 52% to only 84,000 plans in 1993.  (EBRI, 1997).  As a result, by
1993, defined contribution plans made up 88% of outstanding plans.
Through the 1980s, however, defined benefit plans continued to cover more participants
than DC plans.  In 1975, 74% of plan participants were covered by DB plans.  By 1993,
however, over half (52%) of pension plan participants were covered by DC plans.  Barring any
future legislative changes that would reverse this trend, DC plans promise to continue to grow in
relative importance in the coming years.5
A large part of this growth came in the form of 401(k) plan participation.  Over the ten-
year period from 1984 to 1993, the number of participants in private-sector qualified 401(k)
plans rose from 7.5 million to 23.1 million. (EBRI, 1997)  In 1991, 35% of those age 65-69 held
assets in targeted retirement savings accounts.  By the year 2025, assets in 401(k) plans are
expected to be 90% as large as the present discounted value of Social Security assets.  (Poterba,
Venti & Wise, 1998).
DC plan distributions at retirement typically may take the form of lump-sum payments,
installment payments, or a life annuity.  Most plans allow participants some choice over the form
of the distribution.  This is in sharp contrast to DB plans, the majority of which do not permit
lump-sum distributions at retirement.  According to Watson-Wyatt, only 29% of DB plans
permit an unlimited lump-sum payment in lieu of an annuitized pension at retirement, with
another 8% allowing a partial lump-sum.  (McGill, 1996).  Many DB plan sponsors discourage
lump-sum distributions at retirement to limit exposure to adverse selection, and/or to ensure that
employees do not squander or outlive their pension resources.
In the sub-sample of the Health and Retirement Survey that I will use in my analysis,
48% of households expect to annuitize at least some portion of their defined contribution account
balances.  This is consistent with the aggregate numbers of individuals who appear to be
annuitizing DC balances according to the Current Population Survey.  In September, 1994, the
CPS included a health and pension benefits supplement that asked a limited number of questions
about pension coverage among the age 40+ population.  For a number of reasons, it is not
possible to construct a precise estimate of the annuity decisions of all individuals with defined
contribution plans.  Nonetheless, one can get a rough estimate of DC pension choice from the
supplement by constructing a sample of anyone who is currently receiving their largest or only6
annuity from a DC plan, or who has ever received a lump-sum distribution from a DC plan.
Among the individuals age 65-75 in this sample, most of  whom are already retired, 53% are
receiving a life annuity from a DC plan.
3.  Theory:  A Life-Cycle Model with Uncertain Lifetimes
3.1  The Basic Yaari Model
Yaari’s classic 1965 article was the first to incorporate a random date of death into a life
cycle framework.  He considered the problem of an individual, facing a known probability
distribution over the length of life, determining how to optimally consume out of a given stock of
wealth.  Yaari worked through the problem with and without bequest motives, and with and
without access to actuarially fair markets for annuities.
The most well-known result of this work is the finding that:
“when the consumer has no bequest motive but he is constrained to meet
the requirement that his transferable assets at time of death should be
non-negative with probability one … the consumer’s assets will always
be held in actuarial notes rather than in regular notes.”
In other words, a life-cycle consumer with no bequest motives will always choose to
annuitize 100%, provided that the market for annuities is actuarially fair.  The intuition for this
result is clear.  A consumer can choose to hold assets either as ordinary notes which pay the
market rate of interest r, or as actuarial notes, which pay the market interest rate r plus a
“mortality premium” equal to the mortality hazard rate.  The “cost” of this higher return is that
the actuarial notes, or annuities, are cancelled upon his death.  In the case where the life-cycle
consumer places no value on wealth after death, i.e., he has no bequest motives, then the “cost”
of annuities is zero, and the individual will always prefer to invest in the higher yielding actuarial
notes.7
Previous simulation work has shown that the gains to annuitization in the simple Yaari
model without bequest motives are significant.  For example, a 65 year old male facing with
population average mortality would be willing to give up roughly 1/3 of his wealth to gain access
to an actuarially fair annuity market according to this simple Yaari life-cycle model.  The gains
to annuitization for couples tend to be on order of half that of individuals due to opportunities for
mortality risk-sharing within families.
3.2  The Annuity Puzzle
The stylized result of the Yaari model, that individuals without bequest motives will fully
annuitize their wealth, is clearly not borne out in the data.  Aside from Social Security and
private pensions, very few Americans annuitize much of their net worth.  For example, Moore &
Mitchell (1998) found in the Health and Retirement Survey that 40% of total wealth was held in
Social Security and another 20% in private pensions.  This leaves an additional 40% of total
wealth being held in traditional financial assets and/or housing.  Further, the non-pension annuity
market in the U.S. is quite small, with single premium immediate annuity (SPIA) products
accounting for only a few billion dollars (LIMRA, 1998).
This has led a number of researchers to search for solutions to the “annuity puzzle” in the
U.S.   Among the explanations explored are a role for bequest motives (Bernheim 1991, Abel &
Warshawsky 1988), the role of adverse selection and administrative load factors (Friedman &
Warshawsky 1988, Mitchell, et al 1999), and the ability of families to pool risk and thus
substitute for a private annuity market (Brown & Poterba 1999, Kotlikoff & Spivak 1981).
3.3  Annuity Demand with Load Factors
It is easy to see why the presence of a load factor would diminish the demand for
annuities.  Recall that for an individual without bequest motives, part of the value of an8
actuarially fair annuity arises from the fact that the rate of return on an annuity is higher than that
on ordinary bonds.  This mortality premium arises from the fact that the assets from deceased
annuitants are paid out to surviving annuitants.
There are two types of load factors that can diminish the value of annuitization, however.
The first is a pure “administrative” load cost, i.e., some fraction of the premium that the
insurance company takes “off the top” to cover administrative expenses and accounting profits.
If the load factor is high enough to offset the benefits of annuitization, a rational life-cycle
individual will choose not to purchase annuities.
The second type of load factor arises from the heterogeneity in survival probabilities in
the population.  The expected discounted value of annuity benefits will vary across individuals in
accordance with differences in their survival probabilities.  Roughly speaking, individuals with
longer life expectancies can expect more benefits than individuals with shorter life expectancies.
1
Insurance companies must take this potential adverse selection into account when pricing
annuities, which has the effect of decreasing the level of the monthly annuity payout that is
offered for a given premium.
Mitchell, et al, (1999) found that the expected net present value of a single premium
immediate life annuity for a 65 year old male in 1995 was approximately 80% of the required
premium.  By using the difference between the population mortality table, and the mortality table
used by insurance companies to represent the mortality experience of the annuitized population,
one is able to partially disentangle these two types of load factors.  Using this method, we
attributed approximately one-half of this premium, or approximately 10%, to mortality
differences between annuitants and non-annuitants, and the other half to administrative costs of
                                                        
1 Strictly speaking, it is the entire trajectory of mortality probabilities, not just the life expectancy, which matters.9
the insurance industry.  Clearly, load factors are one reason that individuals may choose not to
annuitize their resources.
4.  Methodology:  Implementing the Yaari Model
4.1  Methodological Overview
The simple Yaari life-cycle model without load factors, bequests, or other non-mortality
sources of uncertainty indicates that everyone will have an annuity equivalent wealth that is non-
negative.  The magnitude of this annuity equivalent wealth, however, may vary greatly across
individuals based on the behavioral and economic parameters that we assume.  For example,
more risk averse individuals will have a higher valuation of annuities than less risk averse
individuals.  Annuity value should also be decreasing with the amount of wealth that is already
previously annuitized by Social Security and DB pension plans.  Other factors, such as marital
status (which captures opportunities for within-family risk sharing) and age at retirement should
also effect the demand for annuities.
One econometric approach would be to simply model the annuity decision as a direct
function of these variables.  However, the Yaari life-cycle model imposes a specific structure on
these effects, and also allows more readily for the potentially complicated interactions between
these parameters.  For example, the effect of a difference in marital status will likely differ in
magnitude for individuals with different levels of risk aversion.  Therefore, this section develops
a dynamic programming algorithm which feeds these behavioral and economic variables through
a utility maximizing framework, in order to construct an “annuity equivalent wealth” (AEW)
measure that is consistent with the underlying utility theory of a life-cycle consumer.10
This AEW approach is directly related to methods of annuity valuation that have been
used in simulation models in previous work by several authors (Kotlikoff & Spivak 1981,
Friedman & Warshawsky 1988, Mitchell, et al 1999).  The primary contribution of this paper is
to move beyond simple simulations for hypothetical consumers and estimate the AEW measure
for a sample of actual households in the Health and Retirement Survey.  I will use HRS data
whenever possible to choose parameter values for each individual, thus capturing much of the
heterogeneity in annuity values within the HRS population.
4.2  Calculating the Annuity Equivalent Wealth
The annuity equivalent wealth calculation proceeds in 2 basic steps.  In all cases, an
individual is assumed to be solving an expected utility maximization problem, subject to budget
constraints that depend on whether or not annuities are available.  In the first step, the individual
is assumed to have access to actuarially fair, real annuity markets that enable her to fully
annuitize her starting wealth W 0.  The individual chooses a consumption path to maximize
utility, subject to non-negativity constraints on wealth in every period.  Let this maximum utility
level be denoted U*.  It is assumed that the individual does not value bequests.
The second step is to then take away access to the annuity market, and find the amount of
additional wealth,  DW, that must be given to her so that by following her optimal consumption
path in the absence of annuitization, she can achieve utility level U*.  The only investment
opportunity the individual has in this case is riskless bonds.  The amount (W 0 +  DW)/W 0 is the
measure of annuity value that I will refer to as the “annuity equivalent wealth.”
This utility-based measure of annuity equivalent wealth is similar to the Equivalent
Variation measure in applied welfare analysis.  The value  DW answers the question, “how much
additional wealth must we give a person in the absence of annuitization to make them as well off11
(i.e., to put them on the same expected utility curve) as if we provided actuarially fair annuity
markets for the individual.”  One could alternatively construct the annuity equivalent wealth
measure in a manner analogous to Compensating Variation by using the non-annuity level of
utility as the baseline for comparison.
More formally, solving for optimal consumption paths in this multi-period, stochastic
life-cycle model requires the use of dynamic programming methods.  Let U(C t ) represent the
one-period felicity function defined over real consumption,  r the utility discount rate, and T the
maximum possible life-span of an individual (assumed to be 115).  Then the consumer’s

























where  the expectation  Et[.] is taken over states of survival, subject to the following constraints:
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In these constraints, W t  is non-annuitized wealth in period t, C t  is consumption, S t  is the
pre-existing annuity payment from Social Security and DB pensions, and A t  is the actuarially fair
annuity payment that can be purchased when supplemental annuity markets are available.
Assume that the individual, prior to any optional annuitization, has financial wealth W
*.  Then
for the case in which no supplemental annuities are available, W 0= W
*, and A t =0,  "t.  In the case
in which the individual fully annuitizes all financial assets, then W 0 = 0, and A t  is determined by
assuming that the expected discounted value of A t  is equal to the initial premium (W
*):
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In equation (3), q t  is the one-period mortality hazard, i.e., the probability of dying before
period t+1 conditional on surviving to period t.  The real interest rate is represented by r, and the
inflation rate by  p.  Note that this formula determines the nominal value of a fixed nominal
annuity.  The real value of this annuity declines by the factor 1/(1+ p) each period.  By setting
p=0, equation (3) can be used to determine the starting value of a real annuity as well.
In order to use dynamic programming techniques, it is useful to introduce a value
function  Vt (W t ), which is defined as:
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subject to the constraints in equation (2).
The value function at time t is the present discounted value of expected utility evaluated
along the optimal path.  This value function satisfies the following recursive Bellman equation:
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Note that the expectation operator has been dropped, as we are now accounting explicitly
for the survival probabilities, and there are no other sources of uncertainty in this problem.  The
Bellman equation reduces the full maximization problem to a series of 2-period problems, which
can be solved numerically by solving back from the final period.  This maximization is subject to
the constraints in equation (2).  I use standard methods of discretizing the wealth space to closely
approximate the solution.  While in some special cases it is possible to derive a solution
analytically, the presence of pre-existing annuities requires numerical methods in the more
general case.
In addition to an amount of financial wealth W
*, I assume that there is an exogenously
determined path of pre-existing annuities {S t }.  I first find the maximum utility V
* for the case in13
which the individual has the ability to fully annuitize W
* in an actuarially fair, nominal annuity
market, so that A t  is determined by equation (3) .   Because this individual fully annuitizes, he
starts off with zero non-annuitized wealth, W 0  = 0.
I then solve the problem again for the case in which annuities are not available.  That is,
At  is constrained to be zero for all t.  I find the amount of additional wealth,  DW, which must be
given to the individual in the absence of annuities such that the utility without annuities is equal
to V
*.
That is, I find  DW such that:
  V(W
*+ DW | A t  = 0,  "t) = V
*               (6)
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This calculated AEW measure essentially captures the maximum markup over the
actuarially fair cost that an individual would be willing to pay.  Notice that this calculation
assumes that all wealth is annuitized, as would be the case in a simple Yaari life-cycle model
with no bequests.
In the case of married couples, the procedure is the same.  However, the value function of
the single individual is replaced by a more complicated function that represents the joint decision
of the couple.  I assume that the couple maximizes a joint utility function that is the weighted
sum of the utility of the two individuals, while allowing for economies of scale in consumption.
The Bellman equation for couples is:14
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Here, V represents the value function for the couple, while M and F represent the value
functions for the male and female for those states in which they are the surviving spouse.  M and
F are defined as in the individual case in equation 5.  Superscripts “m” and “f” on the
consumption and survival probability terms represent the male and the female, respectively.





t .  Note that the parameter  l determines the degree of economies of scale in
consumption within a 2-person household.  When  l=0, there are no economies of scale.  When
l=1, the economies of scale in consumption are complete.  In this paper, I will assume that  y=1
and U
m(.) = U
f (.).  These two restrictions imply that the husband and the wife will consume equal
amounts when alive.
In the case of couples, equation 3 is replaced with a more general annuity pricing
equation for joint life annuities with survivor benefits.  In order to simplify notation, let us first
define P
m












This is the probability that an individual alive at time 0 survives to time t.  We can define
P
f
t  analogously.  Then, assuming actuarial fairness, the pricing equation for a joint and survivor
annuity is:
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In this equation, the parameter  q represents the ratio of survivor benefit to the annuity
flow when both members of the couple are alive.  The most common values of  q in the private
annuity markets are one-half, two-thirds, and one.  For example, a “joint and half survivor”
annuity that pays out $800 per month when both spouses are alive, will pay out $400 after the
death of the first spouse.  This equation assumes that spouses are treated symmetrically with
regard to the survivor benefit.  There is also a class of products known as “joint and contingent”
annuities that distinguish between primary and secondary annuitants.  With these products, the
annuity only drops upon the death of the primary annuitant, not the secondary.
5. The Data & Parameterizing the Model
5.1   The HRS Sample
The analysis of how individuals dispose of their DC account balances would ideally be
based on a large data set of DC participants near retirement, and would follow them for many
years to track the ultimate disposition of these resources.  The multi-year time frame is
potentially quite important, because many individuals may not make a single, irrevocable
decision at the date of retirement.  For example, a person may, upon retirement, roll their DC
plan over into an IRA and allow it to grow for 5 more years before taking any withdrawals.
Then, several years after taking withdrawals, they may choose to take the rest out in one lump
sum.  Alternatively, they might leave the money in the employer’s account for several years
before annuitizing.
This ideal data set does not yet exist.  Most long-term panel studies of the elderly, such as
the Retirement History Survey, were conducted before defined contribution plans became an
important asset class for a large number of households.  Other data sets, such as the Survey of16
Consumer Finances, which provide detailed information on assets, fail to have a significant
number of retired individuals.  These severe data limitations are one important reason that the
question of DC plan disposition has not received more attention in the literature.
The Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), fielded by the Institute of Social Research at
the University of Michigan, promises to be this ideal data set.  The first wave of the study,
conducted in 1992, asked detailed financial, health, retirement, and other pertinent questions to a
broad cross-section of individuals nearing retirement.  Specifically, the HRS target respondents
were born between 1931 and 1941, making them approximately 51 to 61 years of age the first
interview wave.  Spouses of age eligible individuals were also included, so that the age of
individual respondent’s in the HRS varies over a wider range.  Follow-up surveys are being
conducted every two years.
While the HRS promises to be the ideal data set for this question in the future, the young
age of the sample currently limits researcher’s ability to observe actual DC disposition behavior
of a large sample over a long period of time after retirement.  At this time, only two waves of
data have been released in their final form, with a third wave in preliminary release.  Most
respondents are still employed, and as such have not yet made their actual DC annuitization
decision.
As a result, I will use as my primary sample those individuals in wave 1 who are
currently employed, and who are covered by at least one defined contribution plan.  The HRS
questionnaire asks these individuals what they plan to do with their DC account balances when
they retire, and it is this question that serves as the basis for this analysis.
The 1992 wave of the HRS contains data on approximately 7500 households.  In addition
to the household responses to the detailed questionnaire, the HRS has collected Social Security17
Administration data on earnings and benefits histories.  This is an important source of data for
this project, since Social Security wealth is an important determinant of an individual’s demand
for additional annuitization.  As discussed in Mitchell, Olsen & Steinmeier (1996), however, the
Social Security administrative records are missing for approximately 1/3 of the sample.  The
primary source of missing records is lack of permission by survey participants to make such a
linkage.
Of the remaining households, approximately 950 have defined contribution plans that
have a balance of at least $5000 and that provide the individual with the choice of taking the
payout as an annuity. A $5000 premium will purchase an actuarially fair annuity for a 65 year
old male that pays approximately $438 per year.  After losing some additional observations due
to missing data, I am left with a final sample size of 869 households.  Of these, 140 are
individuals, and 729 are married couples.
5.2   The Dependent Variable
The HRS asks working individuals a long series of questions about pension coverage.
For those individuals who report that they are covered by a defined contribution pension plan,
and who report that they have choice over the form of benefits, they are then asked “In what
form do you expect to receive benefits?”  The questionnaire prompts for lump-sum payment,
installments, or monthly pension / annuity.  I define the indicator variable “Annuity” to be equal
to one if the individual states they will take their DC balances as a monthly pension, and zero
otherwise.  In cases where the individual has more than one DC plan, Annuity is defined to be
equal to 1 if they say they will annuitize any one of the plans.
5.3   Calibration of the AEW Measure
In order to implement the dynamic program to solve for the annuity equivalent wealth,18
one must put some structure on the utility function.  I invoke the standard assumption that













where  b is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.  Importantly, 1/ b also measures the elasticity
of substitution between consumption at two points in time.  One analytical convenience afforded
by this choice of utility function is that the problem becomes invariant to the scale of wealth.
Therefore, the value of additional annuitization is the same for two individuals if they are alike in
all respects except for wealth levels.  Importantly, while the  level of wealth does not matter in
this specification of utility, the  composition of wealth between annuitized and non-annuitized
assets does matter, and will be discussed below.
I assume that the rate of time preference  r and the market rate of interest r are both equal
to .03 for every household.  I assume that annuitized DC balances will purchase a nominal
annuity that is declining in real terms by the rate of inflation.  Inflation is fixed at 3.2%, which is
the historical mean of inflation from 1926-1997 (Ibbotsen Associates, 1998).  I will compute the
AEW using each individual’s expected age of retirement, which has a mean of approximately 63
in my sample.
Extensive simulation work in previous studies has indicated that there are four primary
factors that determine an annuity equivalent wealth from annuities within a Yaari life-cycle
framework:
(1)  Mortality Risk
(2)  Risk Aversion
(3)  Fraction of Total Wealth that is Pre-Annuitized
(4)  Marital Status19
Each of these four factors can be parameterized using data from the HRS.
5.3.1.  Mortality Risk.
The insurance value of additional annuitization should quite clearly be effected by the
degree of mortality risk that an individual faces.  For example, an individual who knows their
date of death with complete certainty would not be willing to pay any positive amount for an
actuarially fair annuity, since there is zero risk to insure against.  At the other extreme, an
individual with an equal unconditional probability of dying in each of the next 50 years would
find annuities quite attractive.
To calibrate differences in survival probabilities, I assign each individual the average
population mortality for their birth cohort and gender.  I use mortality tables for each birth cohort
from the Social Security Administration’s Trustees Report (1995).  Using a cohort mortality
table, which follow a specific birth cohort through time, as opposed to a period mortality table,
which looks at the cross-sectional mortality experience at a point in time, is potentially a quite
important distinction.  Cohort tables incorporate expected future mortality improvements, and
thus account for the fact that the probability of a current 50 year old surviving to age 70,
conditional on surviving to age 60, is not equal to the probability of a current 60 year old living
to age 70.
For most of my calculations, I assume that mortality differences arise  only from variation
in birth year, gender, and age at retirement.  The use of a different mortality table for each birth
cohort and gender does capture variation in survival probabilities for two individuals planning to
retire at the same age, but in different years.  This approach, however, does not allow for
potentially important heterogeneity within birth/gender cohorts.  Ideally, one would have a
survival curve that is specific to each individual and that takes into account differences in life20
expectancies, as well as different slopes in the survival curves.  However, obtaining estimates of
within cohort heterogeneity that lend themselves to plausible parameterizations in the model is
difficult.
As a first step in understanding the effect of mortality differences within cohorts, I will
include a separate set of indicator variables for self-reported health status in the equations that I
estimate.  Using a set of dummy variables to add in health information separately from the AEW
measure has the advantage of being easy to interpret, while not requiring that one map health
status into a specific change to the trajectory of mortality probabilities.  The disadvantage of this
approach is that potentially important interactions between health and other determinants of
AEW may not be adequately captured.  Therefore, in Section 7, I will explore extensions to the
basic model that incorporate health and mortality differences directly into the AEW model.
5.3.2  Risk Aversion
More risk averse individuals value the longevity insurance aspect of annuities more
highly.  In order to calibrate this, I make use of a series of questions in the HRS that are designed
to elicit one’s willingness to take actuarially favorable gambles.  The responses to these
questions have been studied extensively in Barsky, et al (1997).  They showed that measured risk
aversion has predictive power for choices over a number of risky behaviors, including the
decision to smoke and drink, to buy insurance, and to hold stock, though the incremental
predictive power is never very high.
Values of beta were chosen based on answers to the following survey questions:
“ Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family, and you have a good job guaranteed to give
you your current (family) income every year for life.  You are given the opportunity to take a new and
equally good job, with a 50-50 chance it will double your (family) income and a 50-50 chance that it will
cut your (family) income by a third.  Would you take the new job?”
If YES:
“Suppose the chances were 50-50 that it would double your (family) income and 50-50 that it would cut it
in half.  Would you still take the new job?”21
If NO to first question:
“Suppose the chances were 50-50 that it would double your (family) income and 50-50 that it would cut it
buy 20 percent.  Would you then take the new job?”
Based on responses to these questions, it is possible to divide the sample into four groups
that can be ranked in terms of their risk aversion.  Furthermore, if we are willing to assume that
risk aversion is constant, we are able to put specific bounds on the value of beta that would
correspond to these answers.
Lower  Upper Value
Bound  Bound Used
1.  Reject both 1/3 and 1/5  3.76      ¥    5.0
2.    Reject 1/3, accept 1/5  2.00   3.76    2.9
3.    Accept 1/3, reject 1/2  1.00   2.00   1.5
4.  Accept both 1/3 and 1/2     0   1.00   0.7
Approximately two-thirds of the sample falls into the most risk averse category.  The rest
of the sample is evenly split over the remaining three categories.
5.3.3  Pre-Annuitized Wealth
The primary insurance value associated with annuitization is that it ensures that the
individual’s consumption will never fall below the value of the annuity.  Since utility is concave
in consumption, this means that the first units of insurance are the most valuable.  If someone has
0% of his wealth in annuities, then the first instance of annuitization will be quite valuable
because it provides a minimum floor.  As additional resources are annuitized, the floor rises, and
additional annuitization is valued less.
Let alpha ( a) denote the fraction of total wealth that is “pre-annuitized.”  Specifically, I
will define alpha to be the sum of Social Security wealth plus defined benefit pension wealth,
divided by total wealth.  Total wealth includes all pension wealth, Social Security wealth, all
financial assets, and housing.  The annuity value of public and private health insurance is22
excluded from both the numerator and denominator.  Alpha is computed as of the survey date.
The implication of this assumption is that the relative composition of wealth between annuitized
and non-annuitized assets will remain constant until retirement.
Due to data limitations, I assume that all DB plans will be taken in an annuity form, and
thus ignore the possibility that a small fraction of individuals may not view their DB plan as
“pre-annuitized” if it has a lump-sum option.  I also assume that for couples, both Social Security
and DB pension provide survivor benefits equal to 2/3 of the benefit to the couple.
5.3.4  Marital Status
Married couples have the ability to pool mortality risk, and therefore should value
annuities less than individuals (Kotlikoff & Spivak 1981).  In fact, simulations indicate that the
calculated annuity equivalent wealth from annuities by couples is on order of half of that by
individuals (Brown & Poterba, 1999).  I use marital status at the time of the survey date in 1992
to determine whether AEW is calculated using the individual or joint utility model.
There are additional modeling assumptions that must be made in doing the calculation for
couples.  The economies of scale parameter  l is set in the base case to be equal to 0.6245.  This
value was determined based on the work done on “equivalence scales” in household
consumption by the National Academy of Sciences (Citro & Michael 1995).  In Section 7, I will
also consider the cases of  l = 0 (no economies of scale) and  l = 1 (full economies).
It is also necessary to make an assumption about the “survivorship” decision of couples if
they choose to purchase an annuity with their DC accounts.  Federal legislation currently
requires that individuals who annuitize pension assets must provide at least a 50% survivor
benefit, unless the spouse relinquishes this right, which requires a notarized signature.  Holden
(1997) has shown that since this requirement was enacted, roughly two-thirds of individuals who23
annuitize accept the default option.  Therefore, I assume a Joint and 50% Survivor annuity is
purchased by all couples.  This means that the benefit level paid after the death of the first spouse
is only half that of the benefit level paid when both spouses are alive.
6.   Specification and Results
6.1  Specification
The basic model I estimate is:
Pr(Annuity i  = 1)= f(AEW i , Z) +  ei (12)
Annuity is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the individual plans to annuitize, and 0
otherwise.  AEW is the utility-based measure of annuity value that has been computed using the
methods described above.  Z is a vector of other covariates, which will be discussed below.  I
will make the assumption that  ei   is normally distributed with mean zero, and thus estimate a
probit equation using maximum likelihood.  This normality assumption is not critical, as a linear
probability model or  a logistic specification produce nearly identical marginal effects.
Specifically, I will estimate:







      where  b’X =  b0 +  b1AEW +  b2’Z
6.2  Baseline Results
Table 1  provides summary statistics for the variables of interest.  Importantly, nearly half
the sample reports that they will annuitize their DC plan.  These proportions are consistent with
the rough measure of DC annuitization that is available through the CPS pension supplement for
the actual annuitization decisions of older, retired workers.  On average, these households have
an annuity equivalent wealth of 1.166, meaning that they would be indifferent between $1 of24
annuitized wealth and $1.16 of non-annuitized wealth.  The standard deviation is 10.5%,
indicating a substantial degree of dispersion in annuity equivalent wealth.
729 of the 869 households (84%) consist of a couple, and the rest of individuals.  The
average household has just over half of their wealth “pre-annuitized” by Social Security and
defined benefit pension plans.  Another 10% of wealth is in DC plans, which average $60,000 in
my sample.  These proportions are consistent with the findings of Moore & Mitchell (1998) who
find that the typical household in the HRS has 40% of their wealth in Social Security, and
another 20% in total pensions (which includes both DB and DC plans).  The average age of the
sample in 1992 was 55 years old, with an average expected retirement age of 63.  In the majority
(62%) of the households, a male holds the (largest) DC plan.
Table 1 also compares the key variables for the group that chooses to annuitize
(“annuitants”) and the group that does not (“non-annuitants”).  This foreshadows many of the
result that will follow.  First, the calculated annuity equivalent wealth from annuities is a full
2.6% points higher for annuitants.  This appears to be driven by differences in the factors
underlying the AEW calculation, including marital status and risk aversion.  One can also see
that annuitants are less wealthy and have slightly smaller DC balances than non-annuitants.
Table 2 presents the results of a simple bivariate probit equation of annuity choice on the
annuity equivalent wealth from the base case.  Reported coefficients and standard errors are for
the marginal effects of the probit, evaluated at the sample means.  Column 1 reports the results
for the entire sample of households, including both married and single individuals, for a probit of
annuity on AEW.  The coefficient on  ¶Annuity/ ¶AEW is 0.61, and is highly significant.  This
means that a one percentage point increase in the annuity equivalent wealth leads to a 0.6125
percentage point increase in the probability of stating that one plans to annuitize their DC
accounts upon retirement.
In column 2 of table 2, I have added a number of covariates that do not enter directly into
the AEW calculation, including indicator variables for race, education, industry, and occupation.
Few of these covariates are themselves significant, and they do not significantly alter the
coefficient on the AEW measure.
Due to the ability of couples to pool mortality risk, differences in marital status are one
important source of variation in the AEW measure.  Therefore, if we look separately at
individuals and couples, we lose a potentially important source of variation in the AEW measure.
Nonetheless, it is instructive to see how well the model performs in these subsets.  Columns 3
through 6 in table 2 report these same results separately for single and married individuals.  In
columns 3 and 4, the results for single individuals indicate that the effect is slightly higher than
for the sample as a whole.  In column 3, a one-percentage point change in the AEW measure
leads to a .75 percentage point increase in the probability of annuitizing.  The coefficient is
slightly higher (.875) when covariates are added.
The results for married couples only are reported in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.  We see
that the effect of AEW is smaller than that for individuals, indicating an increase in the
probability of annuitizing of only 0.56 without covariates, and 0.75 with covariates.
Furthermore, the coefficient for married couples is not statistically significant.  Thus, the AEW
model appears to perform better in the single sample than in the married sample.  The calculation
for married couples must make a number of assumptions that were not required in the individual
model, including an assumption about the nature of household decision making, the extent of
economies of scale, and the structure of survival benefits.  Given the additional assumptions26
imposed on the model, it is not completely surprising that the individual model performs better
than the joint decision making model.  This indicates a potential area for further research.
It is interesting to note that the marginal effect of an increase in the AEW measure for
both individuals and couples rises when industry, occupation, and education dummies are
included, while these covariates appear to have no effect in the pooled sample of individuals and
couples.  Recall that in the full sample, an additional source of variation is that the AEW for
annuities is higher for individuals than for couples, as is the probability of annuitizing.  Thus, the
inclusion of covariates, while it increases the coefficient of AEW in each sub-sample, is offset by
the fact that these covariates soak up some of the variation that is induced by marital status.
6.3  Allowing for Time Horizon Heterogeneity
The HRS asks individuals a question that elicits their “time horizon” for financial
decision-making.  I have defined a variable “myopic” that is equal to 1 if the individual states
that her time horizon for financial planning is one year or less, and zero otherwise.  The term
“myopic” often conveys that people are behaving in a manner that is inconsistent with
optimizing behavior, but it need not be the case.  For example, an individual may have an illness
that leads to a very short life expectancy, thus leading to a rationally short time horizon.
Alternatively, individuals may be following a life-cycle model, but with a very high discount
rate.
2
Whatever the reason lying behind the time horizon response, it is clear that it matters for
annuitization decisions.  Table 3 displays the probit derivatives when the myopic variable is
included both directly, and interacted with the annuity equivalent wealth term.  Columns 1 and 2
                                                        
2 There is an experimental module in the HRS designed to elicit information about discount rates by asking about
desired slopes of consumption paths.  Unfortunately, the question is asked only 200 individuals in the HRS.  Within
this small group, there is no correlation between the desire for an upward, flat or declining consumption profile, and27
again report the results for the pooled sample of single individuals and couples.  We can see that
the relationship between annuity equivalent wealth and the annuity decision is even stronger for
non-myopic individuals.  A one percentage point increase in AEW leads to a .94 percentage
point increase in the probability of annuitizing for this group.  For the “myopic” types, the
relationship between AEW and annuity probabilities is actually negative, though this is offset
somewhat by a higher intercept term.  Once again, these results are not sensitive to the inclusion
of other covariates.
Breaking this effect out by singles and married couples, we see that AEW has a
significant effect in both populations of non-myopic individuals.  For singles, the effect of AEW
is 1.18 to 1.41, and for couples .97 to 1.2.  Importantly, the AEW term is now significant at the
.05 level even in the “couples only” specification.
This indicates that it is critical to control for this time horizon heterogeneity.  For the
83% of the population that is non-myopic, there is approximately a one-for-one relationship
between annuity equivalent wealth and the probability of annuitizing.  There is, however, a non-
trivial 17% of the population whose annuitization behavior is not well explained by a life-cycle
model.  This supports the methodology used by Diamond (1977), Feldstein (1985), and others
who make a distinction between rational life-cyclers and “myopes” when modeling behavior in
the presence of Social Security.
6.4   The Effect of Health Heterogeneity
The mortality tables used in computing AEW do not take into account differences in
health status.  Yet health clearly belongs in the model for a number of reasons.  First, to the
extent that poor health is negatively correlated with survival, this has a direct negative effect on
                                                                                                                                                                                       
their response to the time horizon question.  This casts doubt on the discount rate interpretation of the time horizon
question.28
the present value of a given annuity stream.  Second, if individuals in poor health face potentially
large medical bills, they may not want to self-impose the liquidity constraint that is implied by
annuitizing wealth.
As a first step in addressing this issue, I define a series of indicator variables for self-
reported health status.  These capture the DC owner’s response to a question asking them to rate
their health status as “Excellent, Very Good, Good, Fair, or Poor.”  I treat the “good” response as
the omitted category in creating the indicator variables.  Table 4 reports the results.  In the full
sample, the results are insignificant, although they tend to exhibit a plausible pattern.  Individuals
with excellent, very good, or good health seem more likely to annuitize than those in fair or poor
health.  The indicator variable for “poor” health is quite large, and statistically significant.  It
suggests that an individual in poor health is 30% less likely to annuitize.  This negative effect is
fairly consistent across individuals and married couples, both with and without covariates.  I will
explore the role of these health issues further in Section 7.
6.5  Wealth Effects
One implication of the CRRA functional form of utility is that the decision of whether or
not to annuitize is independent of the level of wealth.  However, there are several reasons to
suspect that, other things, equal, wealthier individuals may be less likely to annuitize.  First, the
risk of “outliving one’s resources,” which is the primary risk against which annuities provide
insurance, is lessened as wealth increases. Second, because one component of total wealth is pre-
existing annuities, individuals who have more total wealth tend to have more annuities.  As a
result, pre-existing annuities from Social Security and DB plans may already provide a
consumption floor that is fairly high.  Third, individuals with substantial wealth may have
become wealthy in the first place due to being savvy financial investors.  They may believe,29
correctly or incorrectly, that they can earn a return on their investment through careful
investment in equities or small businesses, that exceeds the return on an annuity.  Fourth,
wealthier individuals may be more likely to leave a planned bequest, and thus be less interested
in annuitizing.
As the results in Table 4 indicate, there are significantly negative wealth effects.
Specifically, in the full sample a $100,000 increase in wealth is associated with a .72 to .76
percentage point decrease in the probability of annuitizing.  Among individuals only, a $100,000
increase in wealth leads to a 1.2 to 1.65 percentage point decrease in annuity probabilities, and
among  couples, a decrease of .69 to .77.
6.6  Bequests
The extent to which bequest motives effect marginal economic decisions is an unresolved
issue in the economics literature.  Research by Bernheim (1991), Laitner & Juster (1996), and
Wilhelm (1996) all point to the existence of operative bequest motives that affect decisions on
the margin.  On the other hand, work by Hurd (1987, 1989) and Brown (1999) finds little support
for such a view.  Hayashi, Altonji & Kotlikoff (1996) also reject the implications of an altruistic
model.
To test for the effect of bequest motives on the annuity decision, I make use of
information on children, as well as responses to questions about the importance of leaving an
inheritance.  In columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, I include a dummy variable for whether or not
the household has any children.  The coefficient is actually of the “wrong” sign for a bequest
hypothesis, though it is statistically no different from zero.  It is important to keep in mind,
however, that 94% of the sample has children, so there is little variation in the sample on this
front.  Columns 3 and 4 include two separate indicator variables, one for whether any children30
currently live with in the household, and one for whether any children live outside of the
household.  Again there is no effect.
The HRS also asks individuals a question designed to elicit opinions and plans about
inheritances.  The question asks:
“Some people think it is important to leave an inheritance to their
surviving heirs, while others don't. Do you (both) feel it is very
important, somewhat important, or not at all important, (or do you differ
in how important it is)?
I use this questions to create two indicator variables for whether the household believes it
is very important, or somewhat important.  These results are presented in columns 5 and 6.
According to these results, individuals who believe bequests are very important are less likely to
annuitize, but the effect is not significantly different from zero.  The coefficient on the indicator
for thinking bequests are somewhat important is smaller and even less significant.  These results
confirm the basic finding that bequest motives are not a significant determinant of marginal
annuitization behavior.
7.  Extensions and Robustness
7.1  Performance of Model versus “Reduced Form”
At this point, one may wonder what the tight link with the underlying theory achieves.  In
other words, why not simply skip the utility maximization model altogether, and instead enter the
underlying sources of variation, such as marital status or risk aversion, directly into the probit
model.  In order to explore this, Table 6 reports results for a probit model of annuity choice in
which the underlying “reduced form” variables that provide the variation in the AEW measure
are included, along with the AEW measure itself.  Because no claim is being made that the AEW
measure has any explanatory value in the myopic sample, I restrict this sample to the non-31
myopic group.  While not reported in the tables, I have repeated this test using the full sample
including the myopic individuals, and found the conclusion from the tests do  not change.
The “reduced form” variables include marital status, risk aversion (beta), the fraction of
pre-existing annuities (alpha), retirement age, birth year, and gender.  I then conduct two
likelihood ratio tests.  The first one tests the null hypothesis that the “reduced form” coefficients
are all jointly zero, conditional on including the AEW variable.  Comparing columns 1 and 2
does this.  As can be seen, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the reduced form coefficients are
jointly zero.  This is evidence that the AEW measure is a sufficient statistic for these other
variables.
I then run the test the other way, i.e., to test whether the AEW variable is zero once one
has controlled for the reduced form.  Comparing column 1 to column 3 does this.  In this case, I
strongly reject the null hypothesis that the AEW measure is zero.  This supports the fact that the
structure imposed by the life-cycle model has value in predicting annuity decisions that is not
captured by the simply including the reduced form variables directly
3.
7.2  Accounting for Heterogeneity in Survival Probabilities
Heterogeneity in survival probabilities is an important source of variation in how
households should value the insurance aspect of annuities.  Specifically, if an individual has
survival prospects that are more favorable than those assumed by the insurance company in
pricing the product, her annuity equivalent wealth from the annuity should be greater.  In
addition, for a given life expectancy, if the uncertainty about mortality is greater, this would also
lead one to have a higher valuation for annuities.  Up to this point, the impact of heterogeneity in
                                                        
3 I have also run this test allowing for the continuous reduced form parameters to enter as 2
nd  order polynomials, as
well as including all possible first-order interactions.  This results in a total of 24 reduced form coefficients.  Even
with this full saturation of the model, one still cannot reject the null hypothesis that the reduced form coefficients are32
survival probabilities has been explored only by entering health status indicator variables linearly
into the probit specification.  Ideally, one would incorporate differential mortality information
directly into the annuity equivalent wealth calculation, and thus account for the potentially
important interactions between mortality risk and the other sources of variation, such as risk
aversion.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to observe individual-specific survival probabilities.
There are at least two approaches that one can use to approximate these effects however.  The
first is to use the information on health status, which was described in section 6.4, to adjust the
survival curves.  The second is a direct question that asks individuals to provide a subjective
estimate of the probability that they will survive to age 75 and to age 85.
The conceptual difficulty with including the self-reported health indicators linearly is, of
course, that it too may interact in important ways with other variables to change the AEW.  This
is, after all, the same reason that risk aversion and the other reduced form variables were “fed
through” the utility model.  Incorporating health status into the AEW measure is necessarily
much more subject to parameterization difficulties.  There is no clear justification for assuming
that self-reporting poor health leads to a 5% reduction in mortality as opposed to a 20%
reduction in mortality.  In this sense, it differs from the other parameter values used in the AEW
measure, which lent themselves more readily to such a parameterization.
As a first step, however, table 7 reports the results for a case in which I parameterized the
effect of health in the utility maximization model by multiplying each individual’s vector of
mortality hazards by a constant.  The value of this constant is 1.2 for those in poor health, 1.1 in
fair health, 1.0 in good health, .9 in fair health, and .8 in poor health.  Columns 1 and 2 report the
                                                                                                                                                                                       
all jointly zero.  However, one can also no longer reject the null that the AEW term has zero effect, unless the
confidence level is .15 or higher.33
results with and without covariates for the full sample.  As can be seen, the effect of AEW is
slightly smaller than in the case when health differences were not accounted for, but this
difference is insignificant.  In addition, in column 3, I report the results again when I include the
health dummies in the equation, along with the health-adjusted AEW measure.  As before, most
of the health dummies are insignificant, with the exception of “poor health.”  Despite the fact
that health status was incorporated into the AEW measure through an adjustment in mortality,
there is still a large negative effect of nearly a .3 drop in the probability of annuitizing.  While
this is only one of an infinite number of potential ways to incorporate health status into the AEW
calculation directly, it indicates the difficulties of doing so in a way that meaningfully captures
the desired variation.
Another approach that is conceptually appealing, but which is fraught with difficult data
problems, is to use the HRS questions about subjective survival probabilities to age 75 and to age
85 to adjust the respondent’s mortality vector.  The shortcomings of these data are discussed
extensively in Hurd & McGarry (1997).  I categorize these data problems into several types,
including (a) rounding error, due to the fact that the probabilities are reported in increments of
0.1 only, (b) internal inconsistency error, which occurs when an individual reports an
unconditional probability of surviving to age 85 that is greater than the unconditional probability
of living to age 75, and (c) “extreme value error,” which is the phenomenon that a large fraction
of the respondents choose probabilities of survival of 0 or 1.  Nearly one-quarter of the total HRS
sample chose an age 75 survival probability of 1, despite the fact that for the average respondent,
age 75 is nearly two decades away.
Hurd & McGarry have shown that, despite the limitations of the data, the subjective
survival probabilities behave  in aggregate much like actuarial survival probabilities. This finding34
is consistent with earlier findings by Hammermesh (1985) which found that subjective life
expectancies are approximately “demographically consistent,” in that the average subjective
expectation is consistent with actuarial tables.  However, in using these data to study a
behavioral question such as one’s plans for annuitization, the shortcomings of the data appear to
overwhelm the advantages.
Setting aside these difficulties for a moment, however, it is possible in principle to use
these subjective probabilities as though they represent the actual survival probabilities for the
individual.  However, since the utility maximization routine requires knowledge about the entire
survival curve, and not just two points, the problems with the subjective probabilities are
exacerbated.  As a starting point, one can simply include the subjective probability as separate
variable in the probit regression.  I have included it  both as a single variable (taking on values
between 0 and 1 in increments of 0.1) and as individual indicator variables for various
combinations of each of the possible values.  I have also tried  interacting these subjective
survival variables with the AEW variable.  A few of these specifications are reported in Table 8.
In no case are any of the subjective measures significantly different from zero.
Given the lack of explanatory power in these subjective variables, it comes as no surprise
that more formally integrating the subjective probabilities into the AEW calculation does not
produce favorable results.  In fact, the adapted AEW measure that is calculated by replacing the
objective survival probabilities with subjective survival probabilities has no explanatory power
for the annuitization decision at all.  Of course, this calculation is subject to many additional
difficulties, including the need to extrapolate the two-point subjective survival probabilities into
a full vector of survival probabilities.  One method of doing this conversion is to assume that the
ratio of each subjective one-period conditional survival probability to its actuarial counterpart is35
constant from the retirement age to age 74.  Then one can adjust the one period survival
probabilities from the appropriate Social Security table for these ages by this constant.  The
constant is determined so that when the one-period survival probabilities for retirement age
through age 74 are multiplied together, they equal the cumulative age 75 subjective probability
reported by the individual.  A similar method is used to adjust the probabilities between ages 75
and 84, so that they are consistent with the age 85 subjective probability.  Beyond age 85, I
assume that the subjective probabilities are equal to the actuarial probabilities.  This ensures that
the population “dies off” by age 115, the maximum assumed age in the simulations.  Table 9
reports the results when these subjective probabilities are used in place of the population
probabilities in the calculation of the AEW measure.  As suggested above, this adjusted AEW
measure has absolutely no explanatory power.  Given the difficulties inherent in the construction
of individual specific survival curves based on problematic responses, it is not surprising that we
get insignificant results out of the model.  There are few economic decisions that should be so
clearly effected by individual beliefs about survival as the decision to purchase an annuity.
Therefore, I view these results as being indicative primarily of the poor quality of the subjective
survival data.  Future work in this area could be pursued using an econometric framework similar
to that used by Hurd, McFadden, and Gan (1996) in the Ahead survey to adjust the reported
subjective measures to account for focal point bias.
7.3  Alternative Couple’s Utility Assumptions
In my base case, I assumed a degree of economies of scale in consumption for couples
that was based on equivalence scales methodology of the National Academy of Sciences.
Specifically, I assumed a value of  l, the “jointness” parameter, of .6245.  In order to test the
sensitivity of the results to this assumption, table 10 reports results for  l=0 (no economies of36
scale), and  l=1 (full economies).  In neither of these extreme cases does the model perform as
well among couples as the intermediate case assumed throughout.  For the case of  l=0, the
resulting coefficients on AEW is less than half that of the base case, and the significance is
lower.  For the  l=1 case, the coefficients are lower than the base case, but higher than the no
economies of scale case.  These results may be viewed as justifying an “intermediate” jointness
assumption, such as that used in the base case.
8.  Conclusions
This paper has shown th at marginal annuity decisions are significantly correlated with the
predictions of a simple life-cycle model.  I have found that a one-percentage point increase in the
annuity equivalent wealth corresponds to a one-percentage point increase in the probability of
planning to annuitize.  These results support the notion that life-cycle simulation models can
provide us with a useful first approximation of household annuity behavior.
Marital status appears to be a particularly important source of underlying  variation in the
AEW measure and the annuity decision.  Married couples are less likely to annuitize than are
single individuals, presumably due to the ability to pool mortality risk.  These empirical results
support the simulation findings of Kotlikoff & Spivak (1981) and Brown & Poterba (1999),
which demonstrate that couples in a life-cycle model value annuities less than individuals.  This
is an important result for thinking about the impact of policy changes, such as the introduction of
individual accounts as a supplement or partial substitute for the current Social Security system.
Analyses that focus on the welfare implications of individuals may miss important variation that
arises from differences in the ability to pool mortality risk within larger households, potentially
biasing upwards the estimated value of marginal annuitization.37
These results also indicate that the ability of the simple life-cycle model to predict
annuity behavior is strongest among individuals.  Determining the value of annuitization in a
couple’s context requires a number of additional assumptions on the structure of the utility
function and the structure of survivor benefits.  Future work will explore the sensitivity of the
results to alternative assumptions in these areas.
While the life-cycle measure of annuity valuation is significantly correlated with
expected annuitization, there are several factors that lie “outside” of a simple life cycle model
that are important in determining which households annuitize.  First, while the life-cycle model
appears relevant for the majority of the population, there is a subset of the population with short
financial planning horizons that do not behave according to the life cycle model.  This is
supportive of modeling approaches, such as that used by Diamond (1977) and Feldstein (1985),
which account for the existence of both rational life-cyclers and “myopes” in the population.
In addition, these results indicate that individuals in very poor health are significantly less
likely to annuitize.  This consistent with what a life-cycle model would predict if health status
could easily be mapped into a shift in the individual-specific survival curve.  However, it has
been shown that simple methods for adjusting the survival curve, such as scaling the mortality
hazard up or down by a constant based on health status, are insufficient to capture the effect of
health on the annuity decision.  It is also notable that there is very little difference in the
annuitization rates of individuals within the non-poor health sample, i.e., between those reporting
fair, good, very good or excellent health.
Finally, this paper casts doubt on the importance of bequest motives in influencing
marginal annuity decisions.  Neither the presence of children nor the presence of self-reported
bequest motives have a significant effect on the annuitization decision.   This is in stark contrast38
to the findings of Bernheim (1991), and Laitner & Juster (1996), that have indicated that bequest
motives do influence annuity decisions.  These results are supportive of Hurd’s (1986) finding
that bequest motives do not have a significant effect on the marginal financial behavior of older
households.  This indicates that a simple life-cycle model with no bequests generates predictions
that are consistent with marginal annuitization behavior, and as such, provides a useful first
approximation of household behavior.39
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Table 1
Summary Statistics
   Full Sample  Ann uity ==0    Annuity==1
 Mean     S.D.  Mean      S.D.  Mean      S.D.
   Annuity   .480   (.500)
  Annuity Equiv. Wealth  1.166   (.105) 1.154   (.092) 1.180    (.116)
Myopic .174 (.379) .175    (.380)    .173    (.378)
Married .839 ( .368) .872    (.335)     .803    (.398)
Alpha .528 (.199) .523    (.203)      .533    (.194)
Beta 3.95 (1.58) 3.87    (1.63)     4.04    (1.52)
Ret Age 63.1 (3.45) 62.9    (3.35)     63.3    (3.55)
Birth Year 1937 (4.21) 1937    (4.34)      1937    (4.08)
Female .380 (.486) .361   (.481)     .400    (.491)
    Health:
Excellent .322 (.467) .334 (.472) .309 (.463)
Very Good .319 (.466) .290 (.454) .350 (.478)
Fair .070 (.256) .077 (.268) .062 (.242)
Poor .009 (.096) .013 (.11 5) .005 (.069)
Wealth (000’s)607 (658) 664  (769)       544  (507)
DC balance 60.7 (109) 65.3 (118) 55.7 (97.6)
Educ12 .317 (.465) .292 (.467) .343 (.475)
Educ13-15 .222 (.416)   .260 (.440) .180 (.385)
Educ16+ .337 (.473)        .321 (. 467) .355 (.479)
Nonwhite .295 (.456)   .268 (.443) .323 (.468)
Children .939 (.239) .942 (.233) .935 (.246)
Childhome .451 (.498) .454 (.498) .448 (.498)
Childaway .860 (.348) .865 (.342) .854 (.354)
Bequest Very .197 (.398) .208 (.406 ) .185 (.388)
Bequest Some .451 (.498) .458 (.499) .444 (.497)Table 2
Effect of Calculated Annuity Equivalent Wealth on Intended Annuitization
Base Case Probit Results
   (1 )     (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)  (6)
Sample  Full   Full         Individuals      Individuals       Couples       Couples
AEW   .6089 .6547  .7505  .8751  .5575  .7477
(.1650)(.1990)(.3429)(.4027)(.4183)(.4490)
Educ12  .0563  .1835  .0285
(.0613) (.1412) (.0681)
Educ13-15 - .0768  .0503 -.1100
(.0653) (.1597) (.0719)
Educ16+   .0212  .1582 - .0091
(.0675) (.1622) (.0751)
NonWhite - .0176      * -.0138
(.0460) (.0544)
Industry Dummies   No   Yes   No   Yes   No   Yes
Occupation Dummies   No   Yes    No   Yes   No   Yes
Log Likelihood-594.7 -571.2 -92.5 -84.7 -502.0 -479.8
#  Obs.   869   869   140   140   729   729
Notes: AEW is the “Annuity Equivalent Wealth” as described in the text.
Dependent variable is indicator variable “Annuity,” which equals one if the household expects
to annuitize their defined contribution plan, and zero otherwise.  Reported coefficients are the
marginal effects of the probit evaluated at the sample means.  Standard errors of the marginal
effects are reported in parentheses.
*  NonWhite dropped (column 4) due to  collinearity with Industry, Occupation and EducationTable 3
Impact of Time Horizon Heterogeneity on Intended Annuitization
   (1 )     (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)  (6)
Sample  Full   Full         Individuals      Individuals       Couples       Couples
AEW  .9418  .9948  1.181  1.407  .9690  1.197
(.1911)(.2220)(.3878)(.4490)(.4646)(.4942)
Myopic  .2628  .2722  .5897  .6112  .3016  .3376
(.0765)(.0802)(.1402)(.1493)(.1300)(.1306)
Myopic *AEW -1.655 -1.752 -3.07 9 -3.569 -2.175 -2.523
(.4355)(.4567)(1.029)(1.214)(1.128)(1.171)
Education Dummies   No   Yes   No   Yes    No    Yes
Industry Dummies   No   Yes   No   Yes    No    Yes
Occupation Dummies   No   Yes   No   Yes    No    Yes
Log Likelihood-587.1 .563.3 -85.63 -76.71 -499.7 -477.2
#  Obs.   869   869   140   140   729   729
Notes: AEW is the “Annuity Equivalent Wealth” as described in the text.
Dependent variable is indicator variable “Annuity,” which equals one if the household expects
to annuitize their defined contribution plan, and zero otherwise.  Reported coefficients are the
marginal effects of the probit evaluated at the sample means.  Standard errors of the marginal
effects are reported in parentheses.Table 4
Health and Wealth Effects on the Intended Annuitization
   (1 )     (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)  (6)
Sample  Full   Full         Individuals      Individuals       Couples       Couples
AEW  .9441  1.019  1.249  1.484  1.208  1.360
(.1932)(.2244)(.3946)(.4589)( .4785) (.5076)
Myopic  .2717  .2828  .5823  .6065  .3266  .3625
(.0774)(.0806)(.1496)(.1580)(.1296)(.1286)
Myopic *AEW -1.723 -1.814 -3.040 -3.548 -2.373 -2.376
(.4460)(.4670)(1.076)(1.258)(1.158)(1.195)
Health:  Excellent  .0070 - .0036  . 0833  .1347 -.0023 -.0210
(.0448)(.0470)(.1164)  (.1343)(.0480)(.0503)
Health: Very  Good  .0632  .0613  .1875  .2156  .0450  .0363
(.0447)(.0468)(.1087)(.1278)(.0485)(.0507)
Health:  Fair - .0365 -.0636  .2411  .3472 -.0710 -.1287
(.0730 ) (.0765)(.1537)(.1234)(.0767)(.0790)
Health: Poor - .3077 -.2880 -.2788 -.1178 -.2794 -.2734
(.1362)(.1469)(.2958)(.3787)(.1902)(.1977)
Wealth (100,000) - .0076 -.0072 -.0122 -.0165 -.0077 -.0069
(.0029)(.0032)(.0112)  (.0132)(.0031)(.00 34)
Education Dummies   No   Yes    No   Yes     No    Yes
Industry Dummies    No   Yes    No   Yes     No    Yes
Occupation Dummies    No   Yes    No   Yes     No    Yes
Log Likelihood-580.1 -557.0 -82.6 -73.8 -494.6 -471.8
#  Obs.   869   869    140   140   729   729
Notes: AEW is the “Annuity Equivalent Wealth” as described in the text.
Dependent variable is indicator variable “Annuity,” which equals one if the household expects
to annuitize their defined contribution plan, and zero otherwise.  Reported coefficients are
the marginal effects of the probit evaluated at the sample means.  Standard errors of the
marginal effects are reported in parentheses.Table 5
Effect of Bequest Motives on Intended Annuitization
   (1 )     (2)   (3 )   (4)   (5)  (6)
Sample  Full   Full          Full Full Full Full
AEW  .9946  1.080  .9659  1.106  .9539  1.018
(.2024)(.2313)(.1976)(.2284)(.1937)(.2248)
Myopic  .2762  .2898  .2729  .2864  .2719  .2838
(.0771)(.0801)(.0773)(.0803)(. 0776) (.0808)
Myopic *AEW -1.748 -1.851 -1.730 -1.831 -1.713 -1.808
(.4458)(.4666)(.4457)(.4661)(.4473)(.4694)
Wealth (100,000) - .0076 -.0073 -.0077 -.0074 -.0075 -.0070
(.0029)(.0032)(.0029)(.0032)(.0029)(.0032)
Children  .0669  .0915
(.0752)(.0774)
ChildHome  .0245  .0398
(.0354)(.0368)
ChildAway  .0045  .0175
(.0512)(.0533)
BequestVery - .0051 -.0071
(.0487)(.0505)
BequestSome - .0340 -.0358
(.0386)(.0397)
Health Dummies  Yes   Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes
Education Dummies    No   Yes    No   Yes     No    Yes
Industry Dummies     No   Yes    No   Yes     No    Yes
Occupation Dummies     No   Yes    No   Yes     No    Yes
Log Likelihood-579.8 -556.3 -579.9 -556.4 -579.4 -555.8
#  Obs.   869   869   869   869   869   869
Notes: AEW is the “Annuity Equivalent Wealth” as described in the text.
Dependent variable is indicator variable “Annuity,” which equals one if the household expects
to  annuitize their defined contribution plan, and zero otherwise.  Reported coefficients are the
marginal effects of the probit evaluated at the sample means.  Standard errors of the marginal
effects are reported in parentheses.Table 6
Comparing the Calculated AEW with Reduced Form Specification
Non-Myopic Individuals and Couples
   (1 )        (2)      (3)
AEW  1.191  .9419
(.4560) (.1911)
Married  .0802 - .1864
(.1151) (.0531)
Alpha  .1979  .0397
(.1143) (.0969)
Gamma  .0128  .0303
(.0137) (.0120)
RetAge  .0035  .0148
(.0073) (.0059)
BirthYear  .0017  .0044
(.0050) (.0049)
Female  .0232  .0253
(.0415) (.0412)
Log Likelihood-481.1 -484.3 -484.5
#  Obs.   718   718   718
Notes: AEW is the “Annuity Equivalent Wealt h” as described in the text.
Dependent variable is indicator variable “Annuity,” which equals one if the household expects
to annuitize their defined contribution plan, and zero otherwise.  Reported coefficients are
the marginal effects of the probit evaluated at the sample means.  Standard errors of the
marginal effects are reported in parentheses.
Likelihood Ratio Tests:
       Columns           c
2
          Tested       -2  ln ( lU/ lR) d.f. P-val.Reject?
H0:  b for  Reduced         (1) vs. (2)            6.40    6 .3799   No
       Form Jointly = 0
H0:   b for AEW = 0      (1) vs. (3 )           6.88    1  .0087   YesTable 7
Incorporating Health into AEW Calculation
Full Sample
   (1 )     (2)   (3)
AEW (w/ health .8624  .9145  .9194
        adjustment) (.1854) (.2139) (.2178)
Myopic  .2803  .2835  .2982
(.0778) (.0823) (.0825)
Myopic *AEW -1.618 -1.686 -1.770
(.4209) (.4428) (.4532)
Wealth (100,000) - .0075 -.0073
(.0032) (.0032)
Health:  Excellent - .0149
(.0473)
Health:  Very Good  .0607
(.0468)
Health:  Fair - .0511
(.0771)
Health:  Poor - .2831
(.1483)
Education Dummies    No   Yes   Yes
Industry Dummies     No   Yes   Yes
Occupation Dummies     No    Yes    Yes
Log Likelihood-588.3 -561.5 -558.1
#  Obs.   869   869   869
Notes: AEW is the “Annuity Equivalent Wealth” as described in the text.  In this table, the AEW
calculation incorporates a mortality adjustment based on respondent’s self-reported
health status as described in text.
Dependent variable is indicator variable “Annuity,” which equals one if the household expects
to annuitize their defined contribution plan, and zero otherwise.  Reported coefficients are
the marginal effects of the probit evaluated at the sample means.  Standard errors of the
marginal effects are reported in parentheses.Table 8
The Impact of Subjective Survival Probabilities
Full Sample
   (1 )     (2)   (3)
AEW  1.036  .7933  1.008
        (.2260) (.47 95) (.2250)
Subjective Survival - .0611 -.1219
  Probability (SSP) (.0725) (.1285)
SSP * AEW  .3761
(.6556)
SSP<= .2 indicator -.1075
(.0885)
SSP>= .8 indicator -.0283
(.0401)
Myopic  .2910  .2925  .2761
(.0805) (.0804 ) (.0812)
Myopic *AEW -1.850 -1.855 -1.770
(.4723) (.4715) (.4692)
Wealth (100,000) - .0076 -.0076 -.0071
(.0033) (.0033) (.0032)
Health Dummies   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Education Dummies    Yes   Yes   Yes
Industry Dummies     Yes   Ye s   Yes
Occupation Dummies     Yes   Yes   Yes
Log Likelihood-551.8 -551.6 -554.9
#  Obs.   869   869   869
Notes: AEW is the “Annuity Equivalent Wealth” as described in the text.
Dependent variable is indicator variable “Annuity,” which equals one if the household expects
to annuitize their defined contribution plan, and zero otherwise.  Reported coefficients are
the marginal effects of the probit evaluated at the sample means.  Standard errors of the
marginal effects are reported in parentheses.Table 9
Incorporating Subjective Mortality into AEW Measure
Full Sample
   (1 )        (2)      (3)
AEW (w/ subjective - .0687 -.0475 -.0860
           mortality adj.) (.1044) (.1156) (.1214)
Myopic  .0172  .0080
(.0649) (.069 6)
Myopic *AEW - .1137 -.1022
(.2698) (.2839)
Wealth (100,000) - .0076
(.0032)
Health Dummies   No    No     Yes
Education Dummies    No    No    Yes
Industry Dummies     No    No    Yes
Occupation Dummies     No    No    Yes
Log Likelihood-601.4 -601.3 -570.9
#  Obs.   869   869   869
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator variable “Annuity,” which equals one if the household expects
to annuitize their defined contribution plan, and zero otherwise.  Reported coefficients are
the marginal effects of the probit evaluated at the sample means.  Standard errors of the
marginal effects are reported in parentheses.
AEW calculation incorporates a mortality adjustment based on respondent’s subjective
survival probabilities as described in the text.Table 10
Alternative Assumptions About Within-Couple Economies of Scale
l l = Within Couples Economies of Scale Parameter
   (1 )     (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)  (6)
l=.6245l=.6245l=0 l=0 l=1 l=1
AEW  .5575  .9690  .2511  . 4220  .4675  .7026
(.4183)(.4646)(.2413)(.2642)(.4413)(.4899)
Myopic  .3016  .2508  .1343
(.1300) (.1373) (.1078)
Myopic *AEW -2.175 -1.030 -1.092
(1.128) (.6677) (1.169)
Log Likelihood-502.0 -499.7 -502.4 -500.9 -502.4 -501.5
#  Obs.   729   729   729   729   729   729
Notes: Dependent variable is indicator variable “Annuity,” which equals one if the household expects
to annuitize their defined contribution plan, and zero otherwise.  Reported coefficients are
the marginal effects of the probit evaluated at the sample means.  Standard errors of the
marginal effects are reported in parentheses.